Dressed for Succession
Norman Ornstein, a resident scholar at a conservative think tank, offers an interesting piece on Constitutional succession.
Ornstein argues that the order of succession should be changed (its fixed by statue law, not by the constitution) to remove the Legislative officers from the line, since its unconstitutional for officers to serve two branches simultaneously, since it creates a conflict of interest during impeachment trials, since the constitutional implies that executive branch officers should be next in order, and since the opposition party could come to power and thus thwart the voter’s will until the next election. Finally, he argues that the Pro Tempore is a bad choice, because it’s often an older Senator, unable to assume the duties of the Presidency.
The first of Ornstein’s charges is the most off-base: Yes, it’s constitutionally forbidden to serve both branches, but if the legislative leadership needed to assume the Presidency, this dilemma is easily resolved by having that legislator resign their leadership office. If they declined, succession could move to the next officer.
Second, when he writes, “The Constitution says Congress can create a line of succession from among "Officers" of the United States, clearly meaning executive branch officials,” the problem remains that the Cabinet itself is not a constitutionally mandated institution, rather it’s a jury-rigged development. If one wants to play the original intent game, “executive-branch officials” did not and do not exist in the body of the constitution. How can Ornstein claim that the framers intended “officers” to indicate Cabinet officials, when the cabinet is not even constitutionally enshrined?
The most potent of Ornstein’s argument is that it creates a Congressional conflict-of-interest, whereby Congressional leaders have a stake in impeachment trials when they stand to assume the Presidency. “When Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House and tried in the Senate,” Ornstein writes, “he escaped removal from office by one vote -- and among those who voted against him was the Senate president pro tempore, Benjamin Wade of Ohio, who would have succeeded Johnson had he been ousted.” Indeed, this situation also occurred during the Watergate Crisis, where Nixon had no Vice President after Agnew’s resignation, and Speaker of the House Carl Albert potentially stood to assume the office. Luckily Albert was a principled statesman, who emphatically decided that if the need arose for him to assume the office, he would do so only in a acting capacity until a Republican President could be confirmed by the Senate. But the point remains that impeachment could be used as a partisan tool to bring the opposition to power, with the current line of succession.
In any case, the article is well worth a read, and raises some serious issues.
Ornstein argues that the order of succession should be changed (its fixed by statue law, not by the constitution) to remove the Legislative officers from the line, since its unconstitutional for officers to serve two branches simultaneously, since it creates a conflict of interest during impeachment trials, since the constitutional implies that executive branch officers should be next in order, and since the opposition party could come to power and thus thwart the voter’s will until the next election. Finally, he argues that the Pro Tempore is a bad choice, because it’s often an older Senator, unable to assume the duties of the Presidency.
The first of Ornstein’s charges is the most off-base: Yes, it’s constitutionally forbidden to serve both branches, but if the legislative leadership needed to assume the Presidency, this dilemma is easily resolved by having that legislator resign their leadership office. If they declined, succession could move to the next officer.
Second, when he writes, “The Constitution says Congress can create a line of succession from among "Officers" of the United States, clearly meaning executive branch officials,” the problem remains that the Cabinet itself is not a constitutionally mandated institution, rather it’s a jury-rigged development. If one wants to play the original intent game, “executive-branch officials” did not and do not exist in the body of the constitution. How can Ornstein claim that the framers intended “officers” to indicate Cabinet officials, when the cabinet is not even constitutionally enshrined?
The most potent of Ornstein’s argument is that it creates a Congressional conflict-of-interest, whereby Congressional leaders have a stake in impeachment trials when they stand to assume the Presidency. “When Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House and tried in the Senate,” Ornstein writes, “he escaped removal from office by one vote -- and among those who voted against him was the Senate president pro tempore, Benjamin Wade of Ohio, who would have succeeded Johnson had he been ousted.” Indeed, this situation also occurred during the Watergate Crisis, where Nixon had no Vice President after Agnew’s resignation, and Speaker of the House Carl Albert potentially stood to assume the office. Luckily Albert was a principled statesman, who emphatically decided that if the need arose for him to assume the office, he would do so only in a acting capacity until a Republican President could be confirmed by the Senate. But the point remains that impeachment could be used as a partisan tool to bring the opposition to power, with the current line of succession.
In any case, the article is well worth a read, and raises some serious issues.
